I'm getting tired of hearing it. "Don't shove your religion down my throat!"
they shout.
What bothers me the most about this incessant charge is that almost without
exception, these modern-day martyrs for protection from religion unthinkingly do
their best screaming not in response to forced religion, no, but in reply to
what is, in fact, the free exercise of religious speech within earshot of their
hypersensitive ears.
And so, here's my retort.
Do any of these people ever bother to think before they gripe?
How is it – I'm forced to ask – the mere opening of one's mouth in defense of
a religious principle, or the simple electronic configuration on a computer
screen of a deeply held conviction, forces anything down anyone's throat?
Please answer.
Force is an awfully strong five-letter word to cut from a dictionary and
paste into the context of speech.
The Founders and the thinkers who influenced them had a few intelligent
things to say about what does and does not constitute religious force. Please
listen in. Maybe you'll learn a thing or two.
Webster's Dictionary
First, turning to Webster's 1828 Dictionary we find "force" defined as
follows:
As a noun: "Violence; power exerted against will or consent; compulsory
power."
And as a verb transitive: "To compel; to constrain to do or to forbear, by
the exertion of a power not resistible. Men are forced to submit to conquerors.
Masters force their slaves to labor."
These two definitions, apropos of the legal context of forced religion,
present a very strong "Do as I say or else" proposition – that is, "Worship my
way, or else be killed, flogged, imprisoned, fined, robbed or politically
disenfranchised."
An Early American Church Position
Nearly everyone understood this. For instance, in 1835, one faith declared,
concerning the legal limits of Church discipline:
"We do not believe that any religious society has authority to try men on the
right of property or life, to take from them this world's goods, or to put them
in jeopardy of either life or limb, or to inflict any physical punishment upon
them. They can only excommunicate them from their society, and withdraw from
them their fellowship." (1)
Similarly, as far as religious influence in government, the following ought
to be unlawful: "wherein one religious society is fostered and another
proscribed in its spiritual privileges, and the individual rights of its members
as citizens, denied." (2)
And so, we have again:
Force in religion involves taking away or threatening life, limb, property or
civil rights. Such force is never legitimate, not by church and not by state.
As a preventive measure, a state church ought to be unlawful.
Locke on Toleration
The above 19th century definitions coincide with John Locke's 1689 approach
in "A Letter Concerning Toleration." (3) Here Locke laid out seven commonsense
principles as to what is forced religion, and what is not.
1. The "sword, or other instruments of force" can never be used to convert,
to proscribe "outward forms" of religious worship, or to administer church
discipline.
The reason is simple:
"[T]rue and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind,
without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the
understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward
force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature
can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they
have framed of things."
"[T]o impose such things ... upon ... people, contrary to their own judgment,
is in effect to command them to offend God. ..."
Locke understood what moderns miss: Opposition to force in religious affairs
was introduced into public life by those who sought to reverence God's order of
free agency, while national church schemes were set up by those antagonistic to
the order of God, with this proof: Never was there a national church which
promoted moral behavior, the real crux of religion.
2. Nevertheless, Locke taught, short of force, the Church does have a right
to discipline its members, as already indicated.
"If ... offenders will not be reclaimed ... there remains nothing further to
be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons ... be cast out. This is
the last and utmost force of ecclesiastical authority."
3. So long as religious organizations comply with rules 1 and 2, the
excommunicated have no legal grounds to appeal to civil authority, because there
is no "civil right" to membership in a "spontaneous [or voluntary] society."
Membership in private societies is a privilege, and every such society has a
"fundamental and immutable right" to make its own rules.
Or, to apply the above to civil rights claims by those today who have been
fired or dismissed from church employment or, for example, the Boy Scouts on
moral grounds, the true nature of the gripe unveils an attempt to use civil
force to impose disbelief, disorder and debauchery upon a religious or private
society.
4. While government officials are forbidden to bring force to bear in matters
of faith, they do have every right and responsibility to use every tool of
religious persuasion at their disposal. Said Locke:
"It may indeed be alleged that the magistrate may make use of arguments, and,
thereby; draw the heterodox into the way of truth, and procure their salvation.
I grant it; ... this is common to him with other men. In teaching, instructing,
and redressing the erroneous by reason, he may certainly do what becomes any
good man to do. Magistracy does not oblige him to put off either humanity or
Christianity. ... [This] charitable care ... cannot be denied any man."
What's wrong with that? Locke makes sense.
5. If we think about it, the dividing line between freedom and force in
religion is pretty simple, not confusing: "[I]t is one thing to persuade,
another to command; one thing to press with arguments, another with penalties."
Freedom of speech, press, and assembly are the truest friends of religious
liberty – attempts to take these away are the real agents of force.
6. Religious persuasion belongs in public life for another vital reason:
Without it, "the whole subject-matter of law-making is taken away."
Religious morals, taught Locke, are "indifferent things," consisting of basic
rights and wrongs common to all faiths, and common among all unbelievers
(through reason), as well, and it is upon these common rights and wrongs all law
rests.
7. Finally, religious morality ought to be defended, not just by persuasion,
but by force on those matters which concern the safety of the state and the
individual. "This is the original use [of government]," simply the protection of
man's God-given rights. Or, as Issac Backus wrote in his 1773 "An Appeal to the
Public for Religious Liberty," "the only crimes which fall within the
magistrate's jurisdiction to punish, are only such as would work ill to our
neighbor." (4)
Locke and Backus are speaking of justice, or the negative application of
moral principle in the law. To defend such laws as coming from God - or to say,
in essence, 'the Moral Governor of the Universe warns that beyond this point
lays anarchy not liberty' - does not impose religious belief, for it does not
control religious conduct, nor impose positive behavior and choices. What it
does do is set a fixed negative or standard of this far and no farther, drawing
a line in the titanium that those who cross over this line, violently disturbing
the peace, striking a blow at every man's liberty will be punished, now and
forever, making our rights, therefore, truly inalienable.
Thus, Locke concludes:
"A good life, in which consist not the least part of religion and true piety,
concerns also the civil government; and in it lies the safety both of men's
souls and of the commonwealth. Moral actions belong, therefore, to the
jurisdiction both of the outward and inward court; both of the civil and
domestic governor; I mean both of the magistrate and conscience."
Unlike the moral cowards who tremble in the presence of God-hating
intimidation groups and their incessant charges that mere verbal and written
defenses of religious principles constitute force – our progenitors knew what
force was, and what it was not, and as moral beings stood up responsibly,
faithfully, on God's side, as they saw it, in whatsoever situation they were, in
public and in private, in the legislature and in the classroom, for the reasons
stated above, plus one more.
Noah Webster's Honest Insight
Wrote revolutionary soldier, legislator, judge, American Founder and creator
of the aforementioned Webster's Dictionary, Noah Webster:
"The religion which has introduced civil liberty, is the religion of Christ
and his apostles, which enjoins humility, piety and benevolence; which
acknowledges in every person a brother, or a sister, and a citizen with equal
rights. This is genuine Christianity, and to this we owe our free institutions."
(5)
Conclusion
So, here's the truth: Denouncing religious speech in public places or by
public servants as force is a farce. What is speech but persuasion? What is the
voicing of one's convictions but a right and the stamp of a person's
individuality? What is the defense of public morality in a republic but common
sense? Whence cometh the source of our free laws and our rights but from God?
Saint and sinner, believer and scoffer, if they look back to history, back to
faith, back to reason, will soon realize that the right to engage in religious
speech in public and in private is a fundamental right every person possesses.
Forced religion? Force is a far, far different issue. In fact, outlawing
religious speech in public – now that is force, that is the position of the
enemy of human freedom.
Footnotes
1. Doctrine and Covenants, 134: 10. Salt Lake City, Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints.
2. Ibid., 134: 9.
3. Locke, John. "A Letter Concerning Religious Toleration, 1689, available
online at www.constitution.org
4. Sandoz, Ellis, Ed. "Political Sermons of the Founding Era, 1730-1805,"
Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, 1998, p. 336. See also Romans 13: 1-10. Backus wrote
in defense of the Baptist Church.
5. Webster, Noah. "History of the United States," New Haven: Durrie & Peck,
1832, p. 300.
